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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of different forms of corporate governance on 
the structure and nature of stakeholder relationships within organizations and 
the consequent impact on employment relations within the firm. In this, HRM 
assumes a dual role in delivering improvements in production efficiency and in 
fostering employee commitment to the organization and its objectives. 
However, different forms of corporate governance prioritise stakeholder 
interests in ways that may bring these two objectives into conflict.  To address 
these questions, we examine the interrelationship between corporate 
governance, HRM practices and HRM outcomes in a comparative analysis of 
companies operating under alternative forms of governance, including private 
sector, public sector and family-owned firms. The empirical analysis is based on 
the UK Work and Employment Relations Survey (WERS98). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Dominant forms of work organisation have evolved from authoritarian 
management systems and Taylorist concepts embodied in scientific 
management to more human relations oriented forms associated with modern 
human resource management (HRM). In each stage of this development, the 
efficient organisation of work in production has been the focus and it is now 
widely recognised that across organisations, performance is enhanced by the 
effective management of human resources and the development of 
organisational commitment on the part of both labour and management (Guest, 
1987; Legge, 1995; Walton, 1985). In parallel development, in the Anglo-
American context, systems of corporate ownership and control have evolved in 
ways that reinforce traditional systems of governance; and this has had an 
impact on the ability of organisations to operationalise HRM and thereby to 
resolve their common problems in the area of production management. By 
designating a dominant stakeholder group and prioritizing interests accordingly, 
corporate governance has an important influence on the structure and nature of 
stakeholder relationships and on the credibility of commitments that 
stakeholders are able to make to one another; and this in turn affects their 
willingness to fully participate in productive activities.   
 
This paper investigates the interrelationship between corporate governance and 
HRM practices and outcomes at the level of the firm. The influence of corporate 
governance on the nature of the HRM practices that are designed and 
implemented within an organization derives from the requirements of the 
dominant stakeholder and the contribution HRM might make to the 
achievement of these objectives.  Corporate governance also has consequences 
for the effective translation of HRM practices into HRM outcomes because by 
prioritizing stakeholder interests, it determines the degree of organizational 
commitment that internal stakeholders are willing and able to extend to one 
another. To examine these relationships, we conduct a comparative analysis of 
companies operating under alternative forms of corporate governance, including 
public sector organisations, in which the government is the dominant 
stakeholder; private sector PLCs, in which the shareholder is the dominant 
stakeholder and the interests of tax-payers / customers are prioritised; owner-
managed companies, in which the owner-manager is the dominant stakeholder; 
and other forms of private sector firms, in which stakeholder control is more 
diffused.  
 
Section two considers the interrelationship between corporate governance and 
HRM in the context of the corporate productive system.  In this, we develop a 
framework for understanding this inter-relationship and the credibility of 
commitments that stakeholders in organizations operating under alternative 
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forms of corporate governance are able to make to one another. Section three 
analyses these relationships empirically, using the 1998 Work and Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS98) which permits analysis of the relationship between 
these forms of corporate governance and HRM practices and outcomes. Section 
four draws conclusions from the preceding analysis. 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HRM 
 
Corporate governance is essentially concerned with issues of ownership and 
control within the firm (Berle and Means, 1932).  It sets the terms and 
conditions of the legal allocation of property rights among the different 
stakeholder groups; and this affects their incentives and hence their willingness 
to cooperate with one another in productive activities.  Corporate governance 
therefore impacts the effectiveness of HRM practices in achieving the 
productive objectives to which they have been set. Because the diffusion of 
responsibility for production, process improvement and innovation has been 
shown to significantly improve organisational performance through the 
cooperation of stakeholders in the productive process and their voluntary 
contribution of skills, experience and commitment to meet organisational 
objectives, corporate governance plays a central role in the ability of firms to 
perform effectively over the long term (Baker, 1999; Black and Lynch, 1997; 
Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Straus, 1996; 
Konzelmann, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998). 
 
Corporate Governance and stakeholder relations 
At the level of the firm, corporate governance establishes the legal configuration 
of stakeholder relations, in which there is usually a dominant stakeholder group 
whose interests are prioritized accordingly.  By designating a dominant 
stakeholder group, corporate governance serves to structure stakeholder 
relationships, the nature of which will be importantly determined by the 
requirements of the dominant stakeholder group.   
 
Internal and external corporate stakeholder groups can be identified, based on 
their relative proximity to the processes of value creation within the 
organisation.  Internal stakeholders, for example, would include managers and 
employees while external stakeholders would include shareholders and the 
government.i  In organizations with a dominant internal stakeholder, there are 
fewer constraints on the ability of managers and employees to work together in 
pursuit of their shared objectives in such things as long term organizational 
viability which forms the basis of their respective employment and income 
security.  However, the further the dominant stakeholder is from the processes 
of production, the more difficult it becomes for internal stakeholders to 
  3 
implement and maintain strategic approaches aimed at long term production 
effectiveness.  In organizations with a dominant external stakeholder such as 
shareholders or the government, for example, managerial commitments to 
internal stakeholders are conditional on the requirements of the dominant 
stakeholder; and this may be in opposition to those of internal stakeholder 
groups, making it more difficult to secure the commitment of these stakeholders 
to broader organisational objectives. 
 
The requirements of the dominant stakeholder are therefore likely to impact on 
the approaches and practices developed and implemented by internal 
stakeholders and on their effectiveness in achieving the objectives they have 
been designed to accomplish.  In public sector firms, for example, the 
government is the dominant stakeholder whose primary requirement will be the 
delivery of high quality products and services at reasonable price for customers 
/ taxpayers.  The ability to accomplish these potentially competing objectives, in 
a sector which is traditionally labour intensive, suggests an emphasis on 
approaches that both secure internal stakeholder commitment to the 
organization and its objectives and maximize the productivity of human and 
other productive resources.  In PLCs, the shareholder is the dominant 
stakeholder, whose primary requirement is likely to be short term share value 
appreciation.  In this case, approaches are likely to be biased towards those that 
minimize short term costs, in particular costs of labour and other productive 
inputs.  In family owned and managed firms, the owner-manager is the 
dominant stakeholder whose primary requirement will be long term profitability 
of the enterprise.  In these firms, the emphasis on long term institutional 
viability, coupled with the likelihood of small size, offers greater latitude for the 
pursuit of strategies involving internal stakeholders in securing performance 
objectives by means of high levels of organisational commitment. 
 
HRM and organizational commitment 
The field of human resource management (HRM) has evolved substantially 
during the past 90-100 years (Wright and Boswell, 2002).  With growing 
recognition of the increasing returns to greater worker involvement in the 
planning and execution of work, as well as to worker self regulation and a more 
democratic style of management, HRM has become an increasingly important 
component of organizational strategy (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Blyton and 
Turnbull, 1992; Guest, 1987).  Broadly speaking, its purpose is to foster a pre-
emptive rather than re-active approach to operational efficiency, quality control, 
and innovation by shifting responsibility and accountability for decision making 
(on the part of both employees and managers responsible for employee related 
matters) towards the shop floor. The widespread adoption of HRM testifies to a 
shift in labour management practice ‘from coercion to the attempted production 
of self-regulated individuals’ (Hollway, 1991: 20).  
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In recent years, with the intensification of competitive pressures, interest in 
better understanding and developing sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage has grown; and firms are placing varying degrees of emphasis on 
strategic competencies in the form of intangible factors such as technological 
position, innovation, organizational design and HRM, depending upon the 
strategic orientation they adopt (Conant, Mokawa and Varadarajan, 1990).  In 
assessing the contribution these might make both to competitiveness and 
organizational performance, significant research attention has been focused on 
explaining the performance impacts associated with HR systems, typically 
referred to as ‘High Performance Work Systems’ (HPWS) (Wright and Boswell, 
2002).   
 
Strategic orientation is therefore an important determinant of the approach taken 
in the area of HRM; and top managers will emphasize different philosophies of 
HRM depending upon the organization’s strategic approach, who controls the 
firm and whose interests are prioritized (Zahra and Pearce 1990, p.752).  
Similarly, as theorized by Miles and Snow (1978), different organizational types 
(i.e., ‘prospector,’ ‘analyzer’ and ‘defender’) will be associated with related sets 
of HR practices.  Many studies have tested this theory of strategy, structure and 
process with the aim of identifying the most appropriate and effective HR 
practices for each of the strategic types.ii  Miles and Snow (1984), for example, 
found that ‘defender’ firms (i.e., firms focusing on a narrow and limited product 
market domain, trying to protect their market share) typically have less 
developed systems of HRM.  These firms tend to use internal recruitment and 
selection strategies and to design traditional systems of compensation, based on 
fixed salaries; they rarely appraise employee performance but they attach 
importance to long-term training.  By contrast, ‘prospector’ firms (i.e., firms 
that continuously search for new market opportunities through processes of 
innovation and new product development) make use of more advanced and 
better developed systems of HRM.  These companies normally depend on 
external recruitment and selection processes, performance-based systems of 
evaluation and variable compensation systems; and they usually offer limited 
and informal training.  Ostroff (cited in Wright and Boswell, 2002) also found a 
significant relationship between clusters of HR practices and the firm’s strategic 
business approach.  Because the firm’s governance system is likely to impact its 
strategic orientation, these findings provide an indication of the types of HRM 
practices / systems that firms operating under different forms of governance 
might choose to adopt.  
 
Differences in product market strategies and measures of performance are also 
likely to influence managerial decision-making with respect to employment, 
training and workforce development.  Market-based strategies, for example, 
typically depend on internal measures of firm performance that are primarily 
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financial.  But assigning too great an emphasis on financial imperatives may 
cause managers to lose sight of the importance of firm specific, human capital 
in effective production and service delivery.  This will tend to discourage 
investment in training, contributing to reliance instead on external labour 
markets for a supply of skilled labour.  In market-based systems, too, it is 
typical to use market-type devices to secure employee commitment.  Because in 
the absence of close relations between owners and mangers, there is a danger 
that managers will pursue interests that diverge from those of owners, stock 
based options are often used to deal with the problem of commitment, adding to 
the pressures shareholders are able to exert on managerial decision-making with 
respect to labour and HRM.   
 
Insight into the interrelationship between systems of governance and systems of 
employment can also be found in the work of Gospel and Pendleton (2003), 
who, for example, argue that the incentives and governance structures found in 
the Anglo-American shareholder-based model force managers during hard times 
to shed labour and avoid investments that have uncertain returns, such as 
training.  Although the assumption is usually made that the firm’s primary 
objective is profit maximisation, Gospel and Pendleton (2003) found that 
whereas institutional investors may prioritise short term profits, shareholder 
value and liquidity, family owners are more likely to consider long-term 
organizational viability, control and private benefits to be the more important 
objectives.  The key equity holders in an organization are therefore important in 
shaping HR practices because of the pressure that different classes of investors 
are able to exert on management and the influence this will have on the way that 
work is organized and labour is managed.   
 
The national-level system of finance and corporate governance will also have an 
influence on labour management within the firm because of the relative 
importance national systems assign to such things as labour interests, time 
frames, strategy types, financial measures of performance, the use of market-
based instruments to secure commitment and the extent of employer co-
ordination (Gospel and Pendleton 2005).  In liberal market-based systems like 
the US and UK, for example, managers are required to pursue shareholder 
interests above those of labour, which often forces them to break implicit 
(psychological) contracts with labour in the interest of short-term shareholder 
value.  Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 16), too, suggest that intensified pressure 
from investors has shifted the balance against labour in managerial decision-
making because of weaker statutory protection for labour.   
 
While there is evidence of inter-linkages between governance and HRM 
systems at the national level, there are also inter-relationships between finance, 
governance and HRM within these systems.  For example, some large listed 
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firms in the UK (such as pharmaceutical companies) have stable and active 
relationships with investors and at the same time are committed to employment 
security, career opportunities and human capital development.  The extent to 
which managerial discretion is constrained and influenced by investor pressures 
is likely to be a function of the identity and activities of shareholders and 
managers  (Gospel and Pendleton 2003; Deakin et. al. 2002).  
 
Having discussed the evidence for hypothesizing the linkages between forms of 
corporate governance and labour management (HRM), we now consider the 
relative importance of HRM in relation to corporate governance and 
organization performance. 
  
The idea that an organization’s human resources are of critical strategic 
importance, and that the skills, behaviours and interactions of employees have 
the potential to provide both the foundation of strategy and the means for 
strategy implementation, has led to the emergence of ‘strategic’ HRM (SHRM) 
(Dyer and Kochan, 1995; Lundy, 1994; Schuler, Dowling and DeCieri, 1993; 
Truss and Grattan, 1994).  Strategic HRM is not merely a subset of HRM or 
traditional HRM tagged with the word ‘strategic.’  According to Beardwell, 
Holden and Claydon (2004) SHRM is differentiated from HRM in a number of 
ways, primarily related to movement away from a micro-perspective on 
individual HR functions in the direction of a more macro-perspective (Wright 
and Boswell, 2002), with an emphasis on vertical integration (Guest, 1989) and 
horizontal integration (MacDuffie, 1995).  This strategic orientation has 
important implications for the inter-relationship between HRM and governance.  
 
Most models of SHRM emphasize the importance of ‘flexibility’ and ‘fit.’ 
‘Flexibility’ represents the organization’s capability of recognizing and adapting 
to changes in environmental pressures, opportunities and constraints (Snell, 
Youndt and Wright, 1996).  The concept of ‘fit’ assumes that particular types of 
business strategy are best supported by particular sets of employee behaviors and 
attitudes, which themselves are produced by particular ‘bundles’ of HRM 
approaches and policies (Capelli and Singh, 1992).  ‘Fit’ has both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions, where vertical fit involves alignment of HRM practices 
with the firm’s strategic business approach (Schuler and Jackson 1987) and 
horizontal fit involves consistency within bundles of HRM practices (Baird and 
Meshoulan, 1988).  There are however conflicting views as to the meaning of 
strategic HRM and a number of approaches adopted from which to explore 
HRM which this paper does not allow us to go into; but from the point of view 
of this paper what is important is that strategic HRM is about enhanced 
organizational performance, whether this is in the ‘hard’ sense through cost 
reduction and efficiency driven practices, or through ‘soft’ high commitment 
and involvement-driven value added practices, and the decision about which 
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model to adopt or which mix of models is likely to be driven by the form of 
governance of the organization and the business strategy adopted.  
 
Both the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ dimensions (Storey, 2002) emphasise the importance 
of integrating HRM into business strategy; but they differ in their view of the 
contribution employees might make to the achievement of business objectives.  
The focus of hard HRM is maximising the economic return from labour 
resources.  Its key objectives include continuous improvement in quality and 
performance, just-in-time inventory systems, and statistical process control 
designed to iron out variation in quality, create consistency in meeting 
standards, locate inventory savings and eliminate waste. From the perspective of 
hard HRM, labour is primarily a ‘factor of production,’ the effective 
management of which requires emphasis on the ‘quantitative, calculative and 
business strategic aspects of managing the headcount resource in as ‘rational’ 
way as for any other economic factor’ (Storey, 1987: 6). By contrast, soft HRM 
views workers as valued assets and ‘a source of competitive advantage through 
their commitment, adaptability and high quality of skills performance’ (Legge, 
1995:66).  With a greater emphasis on human relations, the objective of soft HRM 
is to release the ‘untapped reserves of ‘human resourcefulness’ by increasing 
employee commitment, participation and involvement’ (Blyton and Turnbull, 
1992: 4).  Employees are viewed as active inputs into the productive process, 
capable of development, involvement and informed choice.  Communication, 
motivation and leadership are therefore encouraged in order to develop and 
strengthen commitment and a shared or ‘mutual’ vision of the organization and its 
objectives (Beer and Spector, 1985).  ‘The theory is that policies of mutuality will 
elicit commitment which in turn will yield better economic performance and 
greater human development’ (Walton, 1985).   
 
It is important to note that hard and soft models of HRM are not necessarily 
contradictory or mutually exclusive; rather they form parts of a whole HRM 
strategy that may be more heavily influenced by aspects of one or the other.  
Regardless of the relative emphasis on hard and soft approaches, models of 
HRM assign central importance to commitment to the objectives of the 
organization (Guest, 1987; Legge, 1995; Walton, 1985), where commitment 
implies ‘identification with the goals and values of the organization, a desire to 
belong to the organization and a willingness to display effort on behalf of the 
organization’ (Mowday, Porter and Steers, 1982 in Guest, 1987).  
Organisational commitment is important because it is seen to motivate workers 
to work harder and go ‘beyond contract;’ to self-monitor and control, 
eliminating the need for supervisory and inspection personnel; to persist with 
the organization, thereby increasing the returns to investments in selection, 
training and development; and to avoid collective activities that might lower the 
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quality and quantity of individual contributions to the organization (Guest, 
1987).   
 
The objective of HRM is therefore to create a satisfying work environment 
while also rewarding the development of skills and creativity, thereby gaining 
competitive advantage (Handel and Gittlemann, 2004).  The benefits are 
claimed to accrue to both the organization and the individuals working for it.  
However, how and to whom the benefits accrue has been a source of 
considerable debate.  There is evidence to suggest that high performance work 
systems may bring benefits to the organization and its shareholders but not 
necessarily to employees.  In fact, many studies show that these work systems 
disadvantage employees because ‘performance gains from new management 
practices [give] rise instead [to] work intensification, offloading of task 
controls, and increased job strain’ (Ramsay et al, 2000, p.501).  In this, 
corporate governance may be a key contributing factor.   
 
Corporate Governance and HRM 
As discussed above, corporate governance structures internal and external 
stakeholder relationships, the nature of which will be importantly determined by 
the requirements of the dominant stakeholder group.  These requirements will 
have an impact on the organisation’s objectives and the ways by which 
performance is measured and assessed; and from this will flow the strategies 
designed to meet them.  In this context, the HRM practices that are developed 
and implemented can be expected to reflect the firm’s strategic orientation.  For 
example, strategies aimed at producing satisfactory quality at minimum cost in 
the short term are likely to favour HRM practices designed to maximize the 
economic returns from labour resources while strategies aimed at maximizing 
production efficiency and quality through the close cooperation of productive 
agents favour approaches designed to develop employee involvement and 
commitment to the longer-term objectives of the organization.   
 
HRM system outcomes in the areas of HR (people) and HRM (processes) will 
be influenced by the effectiveness of the strategies and approaches taken.  Also 
important will be corporate governance because by prioritizing stakeholder 
interests, it determines the level and degree of internal stakeholder 
commitments.  Particularly important in this respect will be the credibility of 
managerial commitments to employees, which can be expected to be determined 
by the degree to which they are made conditional on the requirements of 
stakeholders other than employees.  In general, the further the dominant 
stakeholder is from the processes of value creation within the firm, the weaker 
their attachment to the organization, the more likely their interests will compete 
with those of internal stakeholders and, consequently, the weaker managerial 
commitments to employees are likely to be.  Corporate governance thus has 
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important consequences for the effective translation of HRM practices and 
HRM outcomes.   
 
Considering the relationship between the four corporate governance forms in 
WERS98 and HRM (See Table 1), in public sector firms, the government is the 
dominant stakeholder, dependent on tax-payers for funding; and the interests of 
customers (and taxpayers) are prioritized in regulations requiring the delivery of 
high quality products and services at low price (and cost). The public sector 
tends to be very labour intensive, and employees are central to the delivery of 
high quality services.  In this context, human resources are likely to be viewed 
as essential in the ability to deliver the potentially competing objectives of high 
quality and low cost because of the benefits associated with the close working 
together of managers, employees, suppliers and customers.  We would therefore 
expect to see high levels of work pressures and extensive use of HRM, both in 
its hard and soft forms, in public sector organizations.   
 
TABLE 1 
Corporate governance and Human Resources 
 
Type of 
Organisation 
Dominant 
Stakeholder 
Primary 
Organizational 
Objective 
Dominant View of 
Human Resources 
Public sector 
organisation 
Government 
(external) 
High quality / low price 
products for customers 
produced at low cost for 
customers / taxpayers 
Central to accomplishment 
of potentially competing 
quality, price and cost 
objectives 
Private 
sector: PLC 
Shareholder 
(external) 
Shareholder value  
(emphasis on short-term) 
Cost to be minimized 
Resource to be exploited 
Private 
sector: other 
Depends on 
corporate 
form 
(internal) 
Long-term economic 
performance and 
institutional viability 
(profitability and 
sustainability) 
Central to accomplishment 
of long-term performance 
objectives and institutional 
viability 
Owner-
managed firm 
Owner- 
Manager 
(internal) 
Long-term economic 
performance and 
institutional viability 
(profitability and 
sustainability) 
Central to accomplishment 
of long-term performance 
objectives and institutional 
viability 
 
 
In PLCs, the shareholder is the dominant stakeholder whose continued 
investment in the firm is largely dependent on the delivery of persistent 
increases in short-term shareholder value. Because shareholders tend to be less 
committed to the organisation than they are to the value of the shares they hold, 
their relationship with other (internal) stakeholders, such as employees, 
suppliers and customers, is a relatively detached one. There is also the potential 
for conflictual stakeholder relations because shareholder requirements may 
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undermine the commitment managers and the organization are able to make to 
internal stakeholders, in particular, employees. In this context, human resources 
are more likely to be viewed as a cost to be minimized or a productive resource 
to be exploited. We would therefore expect to see well developed HRM 
practices aimed at the delivery of short term financial returns and likely to have 
a bias towards calculative or hard HRM.   
 
In family-owned and managed firms, the manager is the dominant stakeholder 
and family member interests in the firm’s long-term institutional viability are 
prioritized. This is also likely to be the case for other types of private sector 
employers firms; these include private limited companies, partnerships, trusts 
and charities, cooperatives, mutuals and friendly societies. In all of these 
‘private sector other’ organisations, it is unlikely that there is a dominant 
external stakeholder and it is to be expected that control will be less likely to be 
concentrated exclusively in the hands of managers. In organisations operating 
under both owner managed and private sector other forms of corporate 
governance, we would expect to see a lower level of formality in HRM 
practices because relationships among internal stakeholders in these firms are 
typically close.  In these firms as well, human resources are likely to be viewed 
as central to the accomplishment of long-term economic performance 
effectiveness and institutional viability, giving rise to a bias in the direction of 
more commitment oriented practices.   
 
Operationalising the analysis of corporate governance and HRM 
The choice of HR practices in the present study was somewhat constrained by 
the data set and the information contained in the WERS98 survey.  However 
from the items available, it was decided to include those that would reflect 
collaborative or ‘soft’ HR practices and calculative ‘hard’ HR practices as 
described by Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal (1999), practices that have 
been shown to have a linkage with finance and governance described above.  
Various authors have suggested that the strategic HRM model contains within it 
an inherent duality between, on the one hand, strong, economic and calculative 
considerations and, on the other, a more humanistic orientation to promote 
mutual goals, mutual influence, respect, rewards and responsibility 
(Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal, 1999). Based on the evidence suggested 
by Gospel and Pendleton (2003), different forms of corporate governance and 
strategy are likely to be associated with different emphases in HR practices; so 
within the constraints of the HR practices surveyed in WERS98, it was 
important to incorporate items that reflected this and the two very different 
perspectives of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ HRM. 
 
Items associated with ‘hard’ HRM include a range of efficiency-seeking devices 
aimed at ensuring that each employee’s contribution to the firm is assessed and 
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rewarded appropriately through individual performance appraisals and 
individually-oriented reward systems.  Incentive systems are explored including 
job security, which has been shown to be a factor influenced by governance and 
strategic orientation. Investment in employee development and training are also 
included as this has been shown to be important for evaluation of the benefits of 
these practices to the business strategy. To reflect the ‘soft’ model of HRM, 
consultation is important as employees are viewed as active partners and core 
assets premised on commitment, communication and collaboration. The 
collaborative emphasis is characterized by efforts to create and communicate a 
culture of partnership between employer and employee as well as among 
employees.  As a result, the level and nature of consultation and commitment of 
management to HRM will allow conclusions to be drawn about the nature of 
HRM associated with particular forms of governance.  
 
As a result of radical changes in employment legislation during the 1980s, it is 
arguable that UK managers are no longer constrained to a significant degree by 
regulative pressures or labour unions (Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal. 
1999).  They are therefore free to adopt a mix of calculative and collaborative 
HR practices with different configurations and emphases relating to the form of 
corporate governance.  Various attempts have been made to identify ‘best 
practices,’ ‘high commitment work practices’ or ‘high performance work 
systems’ (Becker and Gerhart, 1996, P.785).  In this study, those contributing to 
organizational performance that might be related to corporate governance 
include information sharing and consultation (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998), 
incentive systems (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delery and 
Doty, 1996; Pfeffer, 1998), training (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 
1995; Peffer, 1998), organization of work including job design and working in 
teams (Arthur, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998).  Items relating to 
managerial commitment to HRM are included because the level of managerial 
commitment is influenced by form of corporate governance and the degree to 
which managers are forced to prioritise the interests of others ahead of 
employees. 
 
Guest, Michie, Sheehan and Conway (2000a) and Guest, Michie, Sheehan, 
Conway and Metochi (2000b), also drawing on the WERS98 data set, found 
that human resource practices were still not embedded in most workplaces with 
few organizations having in place a coherent range of practices of the sort that 
would be associated with ‘high commitment’ or ‘high performance’ HRM 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002: 189).  But it has not been shown whether 
the practices that are utilised have a relationship with the organisation’s system 
of corporate governance. 
In examining the relationship between corporate governance and HRM, it is 
also important to understand the meaning of performance and how it is 
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measured.  Many attempts have been made to identify a linkage between HRM 
and organizational performance; but these have largely been based on the 
common sense that improving the way people work and are managed leads to 
improved performance (Truss, 2001).  One such attempt was made by Guest 
(1997), who sought to explain the intermediary linkage between HRM practices 
and HR outcomes such as productivity, organizational commitment and job 
satisfaction.  His model proposed that high performance at the individual level 
(which ostensibly leads to improved performance at the organizational level) 
depends upon high motivation, possession of the necessary skills and abilities 
and an appropriate role and understanding of that role.   
 
Based on this assumption, the HR outcome variables in our study include 
employee commitment to the values of the organization and the quality of 
labour-management relations (from the perspective of managers) and work 
pressure, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and the quality of labour-
management relations (from the perspective of employees).  The logic is that 
better HRM outcomes, such as lower levels of work pressure, higher levels of 
job satisfaction and employee commitment to the organisation and a high 
quality of labour-management relations will contribute to greater individual 
productivity and better organizational performance.  It is proposed here that 
these can also be related to the form taken by corporate governance.  Finally, as 
size in terms of numbers of employees has been shown to influence the methods 
used for controlling and coordinating employees, size is controlled for in the 
present study. 
 
On the basis of the above, there is good reason to believe that corporate 
governance will have an influence on the HRM practices employed within the 
firm and that corporate governance and HRM practices together will impact the 
performance of the HR system in terms of achieving the objectives to which it 
has been set.  The model in Figure 1 provides a guide to the empirical analysis 
of the inter-relationship between corporate governance, HRM practices and 
HRM outcomes (below).  
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FIGURE 1 Corporate Governance and HRM System Approaches & Outcomes   
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Social processes 
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Future plans 
Job control, Multi-skilling 
Team working 
Degree of autonomy in: 
Production organization 
Social organization 
 
HRM Outcomes 
Payment systems 
Employment 
security 
Organisational Objectives and Strategies 
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As discussed above, the form taken by corporate governance can be expected to 
have an influence on organizational objectives and strategies, which in turn will 
shape the HRM practices that are implemented; and these, together, are likely to 
impact HRM outcomes.  Based on the data in WERS98, HRM practices include 
training, incentive systems, work organization and managerial commitment to 
HRM.iii These are represented in the analysis by composite variables, 
constructed from variables representing different aspects of these more general 
dimensions of the HRM system.  Consultation, for example, includes 
consultation (both horizontal and vertical) regarding production and social 
processes, information flows within the organization, employment issues, future 
plans and the implications of proposed changes.  Training encompasses training 
for management and employees in the technical and social aspects of work as 
well as information flows within the organization.  Incentive systems 
encompass practices relating to compensation and employment security.  The 
organization of work concerns employee autonomy, discretion and control over 
their work, job flexibility and team working.  Managerial commitment to HRM 
is evident in such things as the training of managers in people management 
skills, appointment of an employee relations representative to the Board of 
Directors, and existence of a strategic plan covering employee development.  
HRM outcomes include such things as employee commitment to the 
organization, quality of the relationship between management and employees, 
employee attitudes about work pressure and job satisfaction.  In the following 
section, these relationships are examined more closely using the data contained 
in the WERS98 survey. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The 1998 Work and Employment Relations Survey (WERS98) was conducted 
between October 1997 and June 1998 by Social and Community Planning 
Research (SCPR). WERS98 was jointly sponsored by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), The 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI).  The largest survey of its kind and the fourth in a series of surveys that 
started in 1980, WERS98 is based on a sample of more than 3,000 workplaces 
in Britain. It involved interviews with managers having responsibility for 
employee relations issues, interviews with worker representatives, and surveys 
completed by more than 30,000 employees. As a whole, the survey represents 
approximately 75 percent of all employees in the U.K.  In addition to general 
information about the workplace and respondents, topics covered in the survey 
include more detailed information about recruitment and training, consultation 
and communication, representation at work, pay systems and determination, 
collective disputes and procedures, grievance and disciplinary procedures, fair 
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treatment at work, workplace flexibility, workplace performance and workplace 
change.   
 
For purposes of the analysis here, public sector, PLC, owner-managed 
companies and other types of private sector firms are compared, together 
representing 2,189 workplaces (682 in the public sector, 829 PLCs, 208 owner-
managed firms and 470 other private sector firms). Of these, the majority (81 
percent) were in the non-production sector, with a higher concentration of small 
firms located in the owner-managed and private sector-other categories (See 
Table 2).  As a result, in the regression analyses below, we control for 
organization size.   
 
TABLE 2 
Sector and Size distribution of firms (percent of workplaces) 
 
 Public 
Sector 
PLC Owner- 
Managed 
Private 
Sector 
other 
Total 
 % % % % % 
Sector      
Production  2% 30% 29% 19% 19% 
Non-production  98 70 71 81 81 
      
Establishment size      
1 to 24 employees 10% 10% 21% 16% 12% 
25 to 49 employees 18 14 30 20 18 
50 to 99 employees 18 17 24 18 18 
100 to 199 employees 19 18 14 17 18 
200 to 499 employees 18 26 7 20 21 
500 to 999 employees 8 11 4 6 8 
1000 employees & over 9 4 0 3 5 
      
Number of workplaces: 682 829 208 470 2189 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 presents in greater detail the variables used in the empirical 
analysis below, showing how composite variables were constructed from 
Management and Employee responses to WERS98 questions, how these were 
coded for purposes of creating the composite variables and how the items were 
aggregated. Significance levels are based on a One Way Analysis of Variance 
comparing the corporate governance forms for each of the HRM practice and 
HRM outcome variables. The statistical analysis and all later regression 
analyses are conducted at the level of the workplace (N = 2,189 for analyses 
drawing solely on manager responses; N = 1,720 when drawing on manager 
responses and employee responses).  Employee responses are aggregated to the 
level of the workplace by taking the arithmetic mean from employees surveyed 
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at that workplace. On average, 16 employees were surveyed from each 
workplace. 
 
Corporate governance forms, HRM practices and HRM system 
performance 
As a preliminary step to looking at how the corporate governance forms 
compare and contrast with respect to key features of their HRM practices and 
HRM outcomes, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) based on 
multiple comparisons as a means of ranking the corporate governance forms in 
each HRM practice and outcome.  The results are summarized in Tables 3 and 
4, below.  From this, very interesting results across the corporate governance 
forms and across management and employee perspectives can be found. 
 
Based on management’s responses, the ANOVA supports the proposition above 
that firms in the public sector and PLCs were considerably ahead of owner-
managed firms in terms of the formalization of their HRM systems, with the 
public sector leading the way in consultation, training, multi-skilling and team-
working; and PLCs leading in terms of individual incentive systems and 
managerial commitment to strategic HRM (See Table 3). These findings are 
generally supported by employee responses with respect to training, 
consultation (about job progress, promotion chances, training needs and pay) 
and the quality of line managers (in terms of their effectiveness at keeping 
workers up to date about change, providing opportunities to comment on 
proposed changes, responding to suggestions, dealing with work problems and 
treating people fairly).  However, employees’ responses contradict those of 
management on the question of consultation whereby management seeks 
employees’ views on such things as future plans, staffing, changes to work 
practices, pay issues and health and safety.  In this, whereas the ranking based 
on managers’ responses put the public sector and PLCs ahead of owner-
managed and other private sector firms, when employee responses are 
considered, owner-managed and other private sector firms take the lead.  
Employees in owner-managed and other private sector firms were also 
considerably ahead of the public sector and PLCs in terms of job autonomy and 
the level of influence they reported over job content, pace of work and 
discretion.   
 
  17 
TABLE 3 
Sector Ranking of HRM Practices based on ANOVA 
 
a. Management perspectives 
 Consultation Incentives Managerial 
Commitment 
to strategic 
HRM 
Training Multi-
skilling & 
Team-
working 
Public sector 1 4 3 1 1 
PLC 2 1 1 2 2 
Private: Other  3 2 2 3 3 
Owner 
managed  
4 3 4 4 4 
 
 
b. Employee perspectives 
 Consultation Management 
Seeks 
employee 
views 
Quality of 
Line 
mgmt 
Training Job 
autonomy & 
control 
Public sector 3 4 1 1 4 
PLC 1 3 3 2 3 
Private: Other 2 1 2 3 2 
Owner 
managed 
4 2 4 4 1 
 
 
TABLE 4  
Sector Ranking of HRM Outcomes based on ANOVA 
 
a. Management perspectives 
 Employee 
commitment  
Employment 
relations 
Public sector 2 3 
PLC 4 4 
Private: Other 1 2 
Owner managed 3 1 
 
       b. Employee perspectives 
  Work 
pressure 
Job 
satisfaction 
Organisational 
commitment 
Employment 
relations 
     
Public sector 1 3 1 4 
PLC 2 4 4 3 
Private: Other 3 2 2 2 
Owner managed 4 1 3 1 
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As evident in Table 4, when HRM outcomes are considered, employees in the 
public sector and PLCs were far more likely to experience high levels of work 
pressure and job stress; and their job satisfaction lagged behind those in owner-
managed and other private sector firms.   
 
This is reinforced by the contrasting perspectives of managers and employees 
with respect to employment security (See Table 5). While an overwhelming 
proportion of managers in all four corporate governance sectors indicated that 
employees were led to expect long-term employment in the organization (81.8% 
in owner-managed firms, 73.4% in other private sector firms, 71.9% in PLCs 
and 68.3% in public sector organizations), employees were less likely to feel 
secure.  However, employees in owner-managed and other private sector firms 
were far more likely to agree with managers on the question of employment 
security and to feel that their job was secure; 70.6% of employees in owner 
managed firms and 60.7% in other private sector firms agreed or strongly 
agreed.  Yet a minority of employees in the other two sectors reported that they 
felt secure (49.1% in PLCs and 41.3% in public sector organizations). These 
figures are very interesting when compared with managers’ responses because 
they suggest that although public sector organizations and PLCs are using HRM 
approaches aimed at making employees feel that their employment is secure in 
an effort to secure their commitment to the organization and its objectives, 
employees themselves are much less likely to feel so.   
 
TABLE 5  
Organisational Commitment of Employees 
 
Managers perspectives 
Commitment to 
the organization* 
Employees are fully committed to the 
values of the organisation 
Employees are led to expect 
long-term employment 
 % % 
Public sector 65 68 
PLC 65 72 
Private: Other 70 73 
Owner managed 69 82 
All 66 72 
Employees perspectives 
Commitment to 
the organization* 
I feel my job is 
secure in this 
place 
I am proud 
to work here 
I feel loyal to 
the organisation  
I share many of 
organisation’s 
values 
 % % % % 
Public sector 41 59 74 56 
PLC 49 57 69 38 
Private: Other 61 60 73 46 
Owner managed 71 59 75 36 
All 51 58 72 45 
* Percentage agreeing strongly or very strongly with statement 
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Returning to Table 4, on the question of organizational commitment and of the 
quality of the relationship between management and employees, management 
and employee responses revealed similar patterns.  The public sector was ahead 
of owner-managed firms and PLCs in terms of both management’s perceptions 
regarding employee commitment to the values of the organization and the level 
of organizational commitment reported by employees, with PLCs lagging the 
other two corporate governance forms.  Nevertheless, as Table 5 shows, when 
the question of commitment is considered more closely, there is evidence that in 
all four sectors, employees are highly committed, with a majority of managers 
reporting high levels of employee commitment to the values of the organization, 
and a majority of employees (higher in public sector and owner-managed firms 
than in PLCs) reporting that they felt loyalty and pride in the organization for 
which they work.  This suggests that while employees have a high degree of 
commitment to their work and loyalty to their organization, this does not extend 
to what managers do with their work or to the values of the organization.  The 
notable exception is the case of the public sector, where a majority (55.8%) of 
employees reported sharing many of the values of the organisation. 
 
As evident in Table 4, from the perspective of both managers and employees, 
owner-managed and other private sector firms were ahead of the public sector 
and PLCs when the quality of labour management relations was taken into 
account.  This supports the notion that despite the informality of HRM systems 
and structures in owner-managed and other private sector firms, relationships 
between managers and employees are conducive to achievement of the 
outcomes that more formal HRM systems are designed to accomplish.  Thus, 
despite evidence of formal HRM practices in the public sector and PLCs, 
relationships, commitment levels, job satisfaction and employment security 
tended to be much better in owner-managed and other private secor firms, 
suggesting that informal HRM systems and structures are positively impacting 
HRM outcomes in these organizations.  
 
However, this conclusion might need qualification, bearing in mind that 
corporate governance is not the only characteristic differentiating the 
organizations in our study.  As discussed above (and evident in Table 2), public 
sector organisations and PLCs tend to be larger than owner-managed and other 
private sector firms.  In the remainder of this section, therefore, we use 
regression analysis to investigate more closely the separate effects of 
organisational size and corporate governance form on HRM practices and HRM 
outcomes.  In the first model, organization size and corporate governance form 
are used to predict HRM practices and outcomes.  In the second model, HRM 
practices are added to organization size and corporate governance form to 
predict HRM outcomes.  In each regression, organization size is introduced in 
step 1 as a control variable and the corporate governance forms are entered in 
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step 2.  In the second regression model, HRM practices are entered in step 3.  
The results are summarized in Tables 6-9. The four category variables of 
corporate governance (Public sector, PLC, Owner-managed and Private sector–
other) were converted into dummy variables, and the omitted dummy variable 
was ‘Private sector–other’ companies. Therefore, in the regression analyses, the 
effects of other corporate governance types are relative to ‘Private sector–other’.  
Due to the large sample size, we restrict our discussion to variables with 
significance levels of p < .001.  
 
Size and corporate governance form as predictors of HRM practices and 
outcomes 
As discussed above, organization size varied across the corporate governance 
forms, with owner-managed and private sector-other firms more likely to be 
small.  Based on the responses of managers, organization size is significant and 
positively related to HRM practices including consultation (beta = 0.20), 
incentive systems (beta = 0.26), managerial commitment to strategic HRM (beta 
= 0.32) and training (beta = 0.09) (See Table 6).  In general, as firm size 
increases, managers are more likely to report the existence of these HRM 
practices.  Based on employee responses, organization size is significant and 
positively related to HRM practices including consultation (beta = 0.13) and 
training (beta = 0.14); and it is significant and inversely related to the quality of 
line management (beta = -0.05) and job autonomy (beta = -0.19).  This suggests 
that as firm size increases, employees are more likely to report that they are 
consulted and that they receive formal off-the-job training but they are less 
likely to report that the quality of line management is high or that they have 
autonomy in their jobs.   
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TABLE 6 
Corporate governance and organization size as predictors of  
HRM practices:  Management and employee questionnaires  
 
Management questionnaire 
 
HRM 
Practices: 
 
 
Consultation 
 
Incentive 
systems 
 
Managerial 
commitment to 
strategic HRM 
 
Training 
 
Organization 
of work: 
Multi-skilling 
and Team-
working 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organization size 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.09*** 0.03 
Corporate governance form 
PLC 
Public sector 
Owner managed 
0.00 
0.14*** 
-0.14*** 
0.09*** 
-0.17*** 
0.01 
0.16*** 
-0.15*** 
-0.10*** 
0.06* 
0.15*** 
-0.07** 
0.02 
0.14*** 
-0.06* 
 
Adjusted R-square 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.22*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
 
Employee questionnaire 
 
HRM 
Practices: 
 
 
Consultation 
 
Managerial 
commitment 
to HRM: 
seeking 
views of 
employees 
 
Managerial 
commitment to 
HRM: quality 
of line manager 
quality 
 
Training 
 
Organization 
of work: job 
autonomy 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organization size 0.13*** 0.01 -0.05* 0.14*** -0.19*** 
Corporate governance form 
PLC 
Public sector 
Owner managed 
0.10*** 
-0.10*** 
-0.12*** 
-0.01 
-0.11*** 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.08* 
-0.04 
0.09** 
0.23*** 
-0.14*** 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
 
Adjusted R-square 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.13*** 0.03*** 
The remaining category of corporate governance ‘Private sector – other’ is the omitted dummy 
variable.  
*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0.01 
* p < 0.05 
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With respect to HRM outcomes, from the perspective of managers, size is 
significant and inversely related to employee commitment to the values of the 
organization (beta = -0.11), suggesting that the larger the organization, the 
lower the level of employee commitment (See Table 7).  From the viewpoint of 
employees, size is significant and inversely related to job satisfaction (beta = -
0.17), employee commitment to the organization (beta = -0.18) and the quality 
of labour-management relations (beta = -0.11).  This suggests that as the size of 
the organization increases, employees are less likely to report satisfaction with 
their jobs, commitment to the organization or a high quality of labour-
management relations. 
 
TABLE 7 
Corporate governance and organization size as predictors of  
HRM outcomes:  Management and Employee questionnaires 
 
Management questionnaire 
 
HRM 
Outcomes: 
 
 
Employee commitment to 
organization 
 
Quality of labour-management 
relations 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organization size -0.11*** -0.05 
Corporate governance form 
PLC 
Public sector 
Owner managed 
-0.02 
0.03 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.05* 
 
Adjusted R-square 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
Employee Questionnaire 
 
HRM 
Outcomes: 
 
 
Work 
pressure 
 
Job 
satisfaction 
 
Organisational 
commitment 
 
Employment 
relations 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organization size -0.01 -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.11*** 
Corporate governance form 
PLC 
Public sector 
Owner managed 
0.01 
0.25*** 
-0.08** 
-0.04 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.10*** 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.01 
 
Adjusted R-square 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
The remaining category of corporate governance ‘Private sector – other’ is the omitted 
dummy variable.  
*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0.01 
* p < 0.05 
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Considering the impact of corporate governance form on HRM practices (See 
Table 6), based on managers’ responses, the strongest model is that for 
managerial commitment to strategic HRM, where organization size and 
corporate governance together explain 21.8% of the variation in commitment.  
In this, being a PLC is positively related to managerial commitment (beta = 
0.16) whereas being in the public sector (beta = -0.15) or owner-managed (beta 
= -0.10) are negatively related.  In other words, and recalling that these types of 
corporate governance are relative to the omitted dummy variable of ‘private 
sector other’, PLCs are more likely to exhibit evidence of managerial 
commitment to strategic HRM (i.e., training supervisors in people management 
skills, having an employee relations representative on the Board of Directors 
and having a formal strategic plan for employee development) than ‘private 
sector other’, public sector and owner-managed firms; and public sector and 
owner-managed firms exhibit significantly lower managerial commitment to 
strategic HRM than ‘private sector other’ firms.   
 
The second largest R-square is for consultation, where 12% of the variation in 
consultation can be explained by size and corporate governance form.  In this 
model, being in the public sector is positively related to consultation (beta = 
0.14) whereas being owner-managed is negatively related (beta = -0.14).  This 
suggests that public sector firms have well developed consultation systems 
whereas owner-managed enterprises tend not to, regardless of size; it also 
indicates that while PLCs and ‘private sector – other’ (the omitted dummy 
variable) have less developed consultation systems than public sector 
organisations, they have more developed systems than do owner-managed 
enterprises.  The third strongest model is that predicting incentive systems, 
where 11% of the variation in incentive systems can be explained by size and 
corporate governance form.  In this, being a PLC is positively related to the 
existence of a system of incentives (beta = 0.09) while being in the public sector 
is negatively related (beta = -0.17).  PLCs are more likely to exhibit evidence of 
incentive systems than ‘private sector other’ (the omitted dummy variable) and 
public sector firms; and public sector firms have significantly fewer incentive 
systems compared with ‘private sector – other’. The incentive systems of 
owner-managed firms do not differ significantly from ‘private sector – other’.  
The other models explain less than 5% of the variation in the dependent 
variable; so they are not elaborated here. 
 
From the perspective of employees, the lower explanatory power of the 
regression models in terms of the adjusted R-square suggests that size and 
corporate governance form are less important predictors of HRM practices and 
outcomes than they are when the managers’ perspective is considered.  We 
therefore restrict our discussion here to cases where the independent variables 
explain more than 5% of the variation in the dependent variable.  As evident in 
  24 
Table 6, from the perspective of employees, organization size and corporate 
governance explain 12.9% of the variation in training, where the public sector 
(beta = .23) exhibits higher levels of training when compared with the other 
forms of corporate governance, and owner-managed enterprises (beta = -.14) 
exhibit lower levels of training. Organization size and corporate governance 
explain 7.6% of the variation in consultation, where the public sector and 
owner-managed enterprises have lower levels of consultation than ‘private 
sector – other’ (beta = -.10 and -.12 respectively) while PLCs have significantly 
higher levels of consultation than than ‘private sector – other’ (beta = .102).   
 
Turning to the relationships between corporate governance and HRM outcomes 
in Table 7, from a management perspective, corporate governance has 
negligible associations with employee commitment to the organization or the 
quality of labour-management relations. From the perspective of employees, 
however, the results are more significant in that corporate governance and 
organizational size together explain 7% of the variance in work pressure, with 
public sector employees reporting the highest levels of work pressure (beta = 
.25) and owner managed firms reporting the lowest (beta = -.08). The form 
taken by corporate governance explains only a small amount of the variance 
(less than 5%) in the remaining HRM outcomes of job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment and the perceived state of employment relations. 
The only significant finding here is where public sector employees report 
significantly higher levels of organizational commitment (beta = .10) than 
employees working in other firms.  This may be an indicator of the high level of 
occupational commitment characteristic of  public sector professions (Burchell 
et. al. 1999). 
 
In general, controlling for size, when the impact of corporate governance form 
on HRM practices and outcomes is considered, from the perspective of 
managers, the patterns conform with those that might be predicted.  Owner-
managed firms tend to have less formalized HRM systems and structures than 
can be found in PLCs, the private sector more generally, and public sector 
firms.  PLCs and public sector organizations are more heavily engaged in both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ HRM practices, with the bias in PLCs towards the calculative 
(i.e., individual incentive systems) and strategic end of the continuum and the 
public sector towards the commitment (i.e., consultation) oriented pole.  
However, the relationship between corporate governance form and HRM 
outcomes is negligible.  When the viewpoint of employees is considered, the 
patterns of relationship between corporate governance and HRM practices are 
less pronounced and at times contradictory with those of management (i.e., with 
respect to consultation).  In terms of HRM outcomes, the strongest finding 
relates to work pressures, with public sector employees reporting high levels of 
stress and employees in owner-managed firms reporting the opposite. 
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HRM practices a predictor of HRM outcomes 
To investigate the degree to which HRM outcomes can be explained by HRM 
practices, we turn to the second set of regressions, where organization size was 
entered in step 1, corporate governance form in step 2 and HRM practices in 
step 3.  The results from the perspective of managers are summarized in Table 8 
and those from the perspective of employees are summarized in Table 9.  Of 
these models, the strongest are those from the employees’ perspective, with 
those based on managers’ responses accounting for less than 15% of the 
variation in HRM outcomes.   
 
Considering HRM outcomes from the managers’ perspective first (See Table 8), 
HRM practices including the quality of line management, consultation and the 
organization of work consistently and positively predict the HRM outcomes of 
employee commitment (beta = .23 for quality of line management, beta = .125 
for consultation and beta = .11 for the organization of work,) and quality of 
labour-management relations (beta = .33 for quality of line management, beta = 
.09 for consultation and beta = .09 for the organization of work,).  In other 
words, managers report higher levels of employee commitment and a better 
quality of employment relations in firms where they also highly rate the quality 
of line management, consultation and multi-skilling and team working. 
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TABLE 8 
HRM Practices as a predictor of HRM outcomes: 
Management perspectives on HRM outcomes 
 
HRM 
Outcomes: 
Employee commitment 
to the values of the 
Organisation 
Quality of 
Labour-
Management 
relations 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organisation size -0.14*** -0.06* 
Corporate Governance Form 
Public Sector 0.00 -0.09** 
PLC -0.01 0.00 
Owner-managed 0.00 0.07** 
HRM Practices 
Management responses 
Consultation  0.13*** 0.09*** 
Incentive systems -0.06* 0.01 
Managerial commitment to 
strategic HRM 
0.05 0.04 
Training 0.03 0.05 
Organisation of Work: 
Multi-skilling and Team-
working 
 
0.11*** 
 
0.09*** 
Employee responses 
Consultation 0.06* -0.13*** 
Managerial commitment to 
HRM: seeking employees’ 
views 
0.02 0.05 
Managerial commitment to 
HRM: Quality of line 
management 
 
0.231*** 
 
0.33*** 
Training (employee view) -0.05 -0.01 
Organisation of work: Job 
autonomy and control 
0.00 -0.06** 
 
Adjusted r-squares 0.13*** 0.14*** 
The remaining category of corporate governance ‘Private sector – other’ is 
the omitted dummy variable.  
*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0.01 
* p < 0.05 
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As evident in Table 9, from the perspective of employees, the regressions 
predicting the quality of labour-management relations, job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment were all very strong.  In these, respectively, 72.9%, 
57.5% and 48.8% of the variation in the HRM outcomes under consideration 
can be explained by including the independent variables of size, corporate 
governance form and HRM practices in the model.  In each, by far the strongest 
of the independent variables is the quality of line management, followed by the 
level of autonomy and control employees feel they have over their jobs.  In 
other words, high quality line management and high levels of job autonomy and 
control are positively related to the quality of employment relations, job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment.  Also apparent in Table 9 is the 
significant positive relationship between being in the public sector and 
employees reporting high levels of work pressure (beta = .24), low levels of job 
satisfaction (beta = -0.06) and a low quality of labour management relations 
(beta = -0.07).  The relationship between corporate governance forms and HRM 
outcomes are not significant for the other three sectors. 
 
Considering HRM outcomes from the perspective of employees, the responses 
of both managers and employees with respect to HRM practices indicate a 
positive relationship between work pressure and consultation (beta = 0.06 for 
managers and beta = 0.13 for employees).  Work pressure is also positively 
associated with managers reporting higher levels of multi-skilling and team-
working (beta = .08) and employees reporting a low quality of line management 
(beta = -.11).  This suggests that consultation, multi-skilling and team-working 
and a low quality of line management generate increased work pressures for 
employees.  Turning to the more positive HRM outcomes, employees’ job 
satisfaction is better in firms where they rate the quality line management to be 
high (beta = .62) and where they report a greater degree of job autonomy (beta = 
.30) and less consultation (beta = -.08); and employees’ organizational 
commitment is highest in firms where they consider the quality of line 
management to be high (beta = .57) and where they have more autonomy and 
control in their jobs (beta = .19).  Employees also report better employment 
relations in firms where they have higher quality line management (beta = .84) 
and greater job autonomy (beta = .09).  These findings in general suggest that 
the more effective employees feel management to be and the greater their 
control over the pace and content of their work, the better will be the 
relationship between managers and employees, the greater will be employees’ 
job satisfaction and the more committed they will be to the objectives of their 
organizations.   
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TABLE 9 
HRM Practices as a predictor of HRM outcomes: 
Employee perspectives on HRM outcomes 
 
HRM  
Outcomes 
Work 
pressure 
Job 
satisfaction 
Employee 
Commitment to 
Organisation 
Quality of 
Labour-
Management 
Relations 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Organisation Size -0.05 -0.05** -0.12** -0.03 
Corporate Governance Form 
Public Sector 0.24*** -0.06* 0.03 -0.07** 
PLC -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Owner-managed -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
HRM Practices 
Management responses 
Consultation 0.06* 0.01 0.04* -0.04** 
Incentive systems -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Managerial 
commitment to 
strategic HRM 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.05** 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04** 
Training 0.03 -0.01 0.04* -0.01 
Organisation of 
work: Multi-skilling 
and Team-working 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
0.00 
Employee responses 
Consultation 0.13*** -0.08*** -0.02 0.01 
Managerial 
commitment to 
HRM: Management 
seeks employees 
views 
 
0.04 
 
-0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.04** 
Managerial 
commitment to 
HRM: Quality of 
line management 
 
-0.11*** 
 
0.62** 
 
0.57*** 
 
0.84*** 
Training  0.05 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Job autonomy and 
control 
0.04 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 
 
Adjusted r-squares 0.12*** 0.58*** 0.45*** 0.73*** 
The remaining category of corporate governance ‘Private sector – other’ is the omitted 
dummy variable.  
*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0.01 
* p < 0.05 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Organisational effectiveness can be seen to extend to the management of human 
resources in such a way as to develop and facilitate the reciprocal commitments 
required for successful long-term organizational performance and sustainability.  
However, the nature and structure of stakeholder relations shaped by corporate 
governance may impose constraints on the ability of managers to honour 
commitments made to employees as well as on the willingness of internal 
stakeholders to fully commit to one another and to the organization and its 
objectives.  While stakeholders have mutual interests in the long term 
effectiveness of their organizations, not all interests are shared.  This can be 
complicated when organizational size and the location of stakeholders and the 
workplace under consideration within the corporate system are taken into 
account (Konzelmann 1995, 2003).  In large organizations, it may be difficult to 
create the systems and structures that effectively align stakeholder interests.  
Whereas in small, single plant firms, all stakeholders have a shared interest in 
the viability of the firm, in large organizations where there are multiple plants, 
lower level interests may be subordinated to those of the organisation as a 
whole, giving rise to conflicts of interest across workplaces, among plants and 
between levels within the larger enterprise.  Likewise, when there is a dominant 
external stakeholder, whose objectives are not directly aligned with those of 
internal stakeholders and the requirements of the production system, conflicts of 
interest between internal and external stakeholders can arise, with potentially 
damaging effects on organizational performance.  Stakeholder relationships are 
also characterised by differences in relative power. How these are managed and 
to what end are centrally important not only for the quality of stakeholder 
relations and the consequent effectiveness of HRM in meeting the objectives of 
the organisation and the requirements of production but also for the ability of 
the organisation to meet the demands of the markets in which it operates.  
 
The basis for maintaining co-operative and high performance employment 
systems is therefore not so much in arguing that there are no differences in 
stakeholder interests, but rather, in creating ways for finding acceptable 
solutions to differences in order to secure the reciprocal commitments upon 
which effective HRM and organizational performance depend (Wilkinson 
2002).  But the ability of managers to commit themselves in this way depends 
upon the extent to which they are required to prioritise the interests of others 
than their workforce and internal stakeholders.  In this respect, the form taken 
by corporate governance has an important influence not only on the structure 
and nature of stakeholder relations but also on the dominant view of human 
resources (employee stakeholders).   
 
  30 
As evident in WERS98, firms in all four corporate governance sectors faced 
intense competitive and regulatory pressures and substantial change; and they 
considered HRM to be an increasingly important strategic response.  In this, the 
patterns in HRM approaches reported by managers follow the predicted 
patterns.  Public sector firms and PLCs were heavily engaged in both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ HRM practices, with the public sector much further ahead in the use of 
non-standard forms of employment, training and consultation.  By contrast, in 
PLCs, there was a bias towards a more strategic HRM orientation and ‘hard’ 
HRM practices such as individual incentive systems.  Owner-managed 
enterprises stood out from the others in the informality of their HRM systems 
and structures; for example, employees in owner-managed firms were much less 
likely than those in the public sector and PLCs to be trained or consulted.  
However, interestingly, the patterns in HRM practices reported by managers 
were not always consistent with those reported by employees, particularly in the 
public sector and PLCs.  For example, whereas managers in the public sector 
reported high levels of consultation, employees reported low levels.   
 
The issue of size is certainly a contributing factor in the level of formality of 
HRM systems and structures, with large firms facing greater pressure to 
formalize their HRM processes and to involve a greater number of people in 
HRM.  In WERS98, large size was associated with the existence of a wider 
array of formal HRM practices; however, it was also correlated with lower 
levels of employee commitment, job satisfaction and quality of labour-
management relations.  This implies that the formalization of HRM may 
compromise the purpose to which it is put, particularly in companies where 
managers are forced to serve ‘multiple masters.’  In this, the nature of corporate 
governance assumes central importance by identifying the range of stakeholders 
that managers must take into account and in prioritizing interests among them.  
For example, in PLCs and public sector organizations, managers must meet the 
requirements of employees in order to galvanise the workforce in the 
development and implementation of HRM systems and structures; yet at the 
same time, they must meet the requirements of external stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, regulators and the state.  By contrast, managers in owner-managed 
firms are less constrained by the demands of external stakeholders and 
consequently potentially better able to meet the requirements of employees in 
such a way as to secure their commitment to the organization and its objectives.   
 
In WERS98, there is evidence of variation in the impact of HRM approaches on 
employees across corporate governance forms.  Employees in owner-managed 
firms, for example, were likely to report low levels of job stress whereas in 
PLCs and public sector organizations, levels of work pressure were high despite 
evidence of greater attention to HRM.  This is consistent with Legge’s (1995) 
contention that all HRM practices are geared towards the achievement of 
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managerial objectives and are designed to be exploitative of labour, whether 
‘hard’ or ‘soft.’  In the public sector (where significant results were found in 
terms of high work pressure, low job satisfaction and a poor quality of line 
management combined with a high level of organizational commitment), this 
exploitation may be facilitated by the high degree of occupational commitment 
that public sector employees tend to exhibit, thereby permitting employers to 
take advantage of their ‘occupational slack’ (Burchell et. al. 1999). 
 
Regardless of the level of formality of HRM systems and structures, the 
findings in WERS98 highlight the importance of the quality of relationships 
between managers and employees in achieving the outcomes that HRM systems 
are designed to accomplish.  Particularly from the perspective of employees, 
HRM practices explained a substantial degree of the variation in HRM 
outcomes; and of these, the quality of line management and employee job 
autonomy and control were consistently the strongest predictors.  Thus, we 
might conclude that regardless of the nature and sophistication of the HRM 
system and the mutuality of benefits they are designed to achieve, if employees 
perceive HRM to be a form of work intensification and exploitation rather than 
a vehicle for employee empowerment and involvement, the HRM system is 
likely to achieve quite the opposite outcomes to those for which the it was 
designed and implemented to achieve.  This underlines the importance, when 
developing and formalizing HRM systems and structures, of focusing on 
employee perceptions of and responses to such arrangements.   
 
The findings from WERS98 (summarized in Table 3) suggest that the form 
taken by corporate governance is more likely to impact the formal or strategic 
level HRM activities (such as consultation, training and managerial 
commitment to strategic HRM) than the informal, day-to-day HRM practices 
(such as job autonomy and quality of line management).  In these, the links 
between corporate governance and HRM were statistically weak or 
insignificant.  However, the findings (summarized in Tables 5 and 6) suggest 
that it is these more informal, local level HRM practices that are the most 
significant predictors of HRM outcomes.  What remains unexplained is how 
corporate governance in combination with a complex array of other factors (that 
includes configurations of HRM objectives and practices) influences HRM 
outcomes.  The next step in this research, therefore, is to more closely examine 
the strategic organization of HRM practices, with a view to better understanding 
these interrelationships.  This further study will be based on the WERS2004 
data set, which includes questions that address some of these dimensions of the 
interrelationship between corporate governance and employment relations.   
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To conclude, given the central importance of commitment for the effectiveness 
of HRM approaches in supporting business objectives, recognition of the 
existence of legitimate conflicts of interest among stakeholder groups and the 
potential for these to undermine the commitment necessary for effective HRM 
and organizational performance is crucial.  This underscores the competitive 
advantages associated with developing effective mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts so as to make possible the reciprocity of stakeholder commitments that 
is required for effective long-term HRM and, hence, organizational 
performance.   
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
i
 Other internal and external stakeholder groups can be identified, including 
suppliers (of productive inputs, physical and financial capital), customers, the 
host economy, etc.  Whether they are considered internal or external 
stakeholders will depend upon the way the boundaries of the productive system 
are drawn.  For example, suppliers might be internal stakeholders within the 
corporate productive system but external stakeholders within the workplace 
productive system.  For purposes of this analysis, the key internal stakeholders 
include employees and managers; and the key external stakeholders include 
shareholders in the case of private sector PLCs and the government in the case 
of public sector organizations. 
ii
 See, for example, Delery & Doty, 1996. 
iii
 Appendix Table 1 provides greater detail on each of the HRM practice and 
outcome variables. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
Summary of HRM Practices and HRM Outcomes Variables 
 
Summary 
Variable 
Meaning Scale  Sig. 
level** 
HRM Practices 
Management questionnaire 
Consultation Count across 10 items: 
1. Management seek employee 
views about job specifications 
2. Management discuss implications 
of change with employees 
3. Those at top make decisions 
4. Decisions made without 
consultation with employees 
5. System of briefings? 
6. Is briefing generally for the 
whole workplace? 
7. Consultation committees? 
8. Wide range of issues concerning 
employees discussed by 
committees 
9. Quality circles? 
10. Other ways management 
communicates with employees  
 
1 = agree; 0 = DK, disagree * 
 
1 = agree; 0 = DK, disagree * 
 
1 = agree; 0 = DK, disagree * 
1 = disagree; 0 = DK, agree * 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
0.000 
Incentive 
systems 
Count across 5 items: 
1. Employees led to expect job 
security 
2. Employees get PRP or bonuses 
3. Employees get individual or 
group performance schemes 
4. Most non-managerial staff 
receiving performance related 
pay 
5. Guaranteed job security for 
certain groups of employees 
 
1 = agree; 0 = DK, disagree * 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
0.000 
Managerial 
commitment to 
strategic HRM 
Count across 3 items: 
1. Percent of supervisors trained in 
people management skills 
2. Employee relations rep on Board 
of Directors? 
3. If yes to BSTRATEG, does the 
formal strategic plan cover 
employee development 
 
1 = 60%+; 0 = less than 60% 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
0.000 
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Training 
 
Count across 3 items: 
1. Percent employees with off-the-
job training 
2. Time spent on off-the-job 
training for employees 
3. Did training cover teamworking, 
communication, problem solving, 
quality control procedures? 
 
1 = 60%+; 0 = less than 60% 
 
1 = 5 days or more; 0 = less 
than 5 days 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
 
0.000 
Organization 
of work 
Count across 5 items: 
1. Percent of employees trained to 
do jobs other than their own 
2. Do employees have discretion in 
work? 
3. Do employees have control over 
pace of work? 
4. Percent of employees in formal 
teams? 
5. Teamwork involves 3 or more of 
cooperation, control over 
leadership, control over work, 
and responsibility for products 
and services 
 
1 = 60%+; 0 = less than 60% 
 
1 = Some or a lot; 0 = little 
or none 
1 = Some or a lot; 0 = little 
or none 
 
1 = 60%+; 0 = less than 60% 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
0.000 
Employee questionnaire 
Consultation Count across 4 items: 
Consultation with line manager 
about: 
1. job progress 
2. promotion chances 
3. training needs 
4. pay 
 
 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
0.000 
Managerial 
commitment to 
HRM (seeking 
views) 
Arithmetic mean across 5 items:  
Frequency managers ask for 
employee views about: 
1. future plans for workplace 
2. staffing issues 
3. changes to work practices 
4. pay issues 
5. health and safety at work 
 
 
All items measured on a 4-
point scale where 1 = never, 
2 = hardly ever, 3 = 
sometimes, 4 = frequently. 
0.000 
Managerial 
commitment to 
HRM (line 
manager 
quality) 
Arithmetic mean across 5 items: 
How good are managers at: 
1. keeping workers up to date about 
change 
2. providing opportunities to 
comment on proposed changes 
3. responding to suggestions from 
e’ees 
 
 
 
All items measured on a 5-
point scale where 1 = very 
poor, 2 = poor, 3 = neither 
good nor poor, 4 = good, 5 = 
very good 
0.001 
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4. dealing with employees’ work 
problems  
5. treating employees fairly 
Training Single item: 
Off the job training in past 12 months 
All items measured on a 6-
point scale ranging from 1 = 
‘none’ to 6 = ‘10 days or 
more’ 
0.000 
Organization 
of work (job 
autonomy) 
Arithmetic mean across 5 items: 
How much influence over: 
1. tasks 
2. pace of work 
3. how work is done 
 
All items measured on a 4-
point scale where 1 = none, 2 
= a little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot. 
 
0.002 
HRM Outcomes 
Management questionnaire 
Employee 
commitment 
Single item:   
Employee commitment to the values 
of the organization 
5-point scale where 1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
0.092 
Employment 
relations 
Single item: 
Relationship between management 
and employees 
5-point scale where 1 = very 
poor, 2 = poor, 3 = neither 
good nor poor, 4 = good, 5 = 
very good 
0.001 
Employee questionnaire 
Work pressure Arithmetic mean across 2 items: 
1. Job requires to work very hard 
2. Pressures to get job done on time 
Items measured on a 5-point 
scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = 
neither, 4 = agree, 5 = 
strongly agree 
0.000 
Job satisfaction Arithmetic mean across 4 items: 
Satisfaction:  
1. influence over job 
2. pay 
3. sense of achievement 
4. respect from line managers 
 
Items measured on a 5-point 
scale where 5 = very 
satisfied, 4 = satisfied, 3 = 
neither, 2 = dissatisfied, 1 = 
very dissatisfied 
0.002 
Organisational 
commitment 
Arithmetic mean across 3 items: 
1. Share values of the organization 
2. Loyalty to organization 
3. Pride in working here 
Items measured on a 5-point 
scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = 
neither, 4 = agree, 5 = 
strongly agree 
0.000 
Employment 
relations 
Single item: 
Relationship between management 
and employees 
5-point scale where 1 = very 
poor, 2 = poor, 3 = neither 
good nor poor, 4 = good, 5 = 
very good 
0.011 
* Indicates that a longer interval scale (such as a 5 or 7-point Likert scale) was dichotomized. 
** Significance level based on one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing corporate 
governance forms for each HRM system, HRM system performance and organizational 
performance variable. 
 
